摘要：Over the past few years, certification schemes in the agribusiness sector have gained great importance as an instrument of quality assurance in the supply chain (Jahn et al. 2005; Fulponi2006; European Communities 2006a). Especially in the EU several standards have been established,which partially diverge extremely according to their focus, target groups and goals.While most of these systems have a rather low diffusion in the food sector (e. g. Label Rouge or Geprüfte Qualität Bayern), certification schemes such as QS, BRC, IFS or EurepGap already cover substantial parts and are widely known within the business (European Communities 2006a). However, the reputation and status which these systems have built up during the past few years, greatly depend on the confidence in meeting the promises of assuring quality and food issues. If the standard is unable to come up to the expectations of consumers and business partners, the value of such a scheme is easy to doubt and trust is going to fade (Fulponi 2006: 8). In consequence, the withdrawal of considerable parts of the supply chain could bring down the entire system. Aside from this effect, a certification scheme is always exposed to the interests of censorious stakeholders (e. g. consumer associations and NGOs) who generally have good connections to media and politics. In this case, even the rumour or accusation of flaws and scandals poses enormous problems for the reputation of the standard.
