文章基本信息

标题：Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art
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作者：Kesan, Jay P. ; Banik, Marc
期刊名称：Washington University Journal of Law & Policy
印刷版ISSN：1533-4686
电子版ISSN：1943-0000
出版年度：2000
卷号：2
期号：1
页码：023-054
出版社：Washington University School of Law
摘要：In this Article we propose that viewing patents as incomplete contracts is a useful means to analyze the relationship between legal institutions of patent enforcement and investment in R&D.
关键词：Contracts; Incentives (Business); Industrial research; Patent law; Prior art (Patent law)