摘要：In the course of exploring the range of regulatory options, this article attempts to make several contributions to the literature on workplace safety regulation. First, it seeks to flesh out some concrete policies aimed at providing workplace risk information to employees. Next, the article responds to behavioral theorists who argue that individuals’ cognitive limitations and biases necessarily render ineffective an information-provision approach to workplace safety regulation. This article shows that even if the behavioralists are correct in their claims about individuals’ limited abilities to process risk information, an information-provision approach may be effective. Finally, the article demonstrates that the informational inadequacy comprising the market failure sometimes consists of more than inadequate risk information on the part of employees; employers also may face systematic informational deficiencies, and any informational approach should address those deficiencies as well. The article therefore attempts to provide some guidance as to when regulators should provide information to employers as well as employees and how they may do so effectively. Part II defines the objectives of workplace safety regulation, first identifying the socially undesirable “symptom” regulators should be addressing and then diagnosing the more fundamental market failure that is responsible for that symptom. Part III then explores the regulatory options for eliminating the culprit market failure, paying particular attention to informational approaches to workplace safety regulation and concluding that such approaches may sometimes require employer, as well as employee, education. In addition, Part III responds to the apparent challenge behavioralism poses to an informational approach to workplace safety regulation.
