摘要：The article's objective is the research of delineation of tax powers with regard to stating tax preferences in the Russian Federation and their influence on the nature of tax competition and the consequences for budgets. It emphasizes that no analysis of the fiscal effect of tax preferences and control of the shortfall in tax revenues of the budget is performed on the government level. It is partially related to the unsolved state of the problem of tax relieves identification. It shows that the adopted in Russia mechanism of granting tax relieves for the regional corporate property tax includes excessive government control on the federal level, which incurs reduction of the level of vertical tax competition. As a result of such distortion, a shortfall in revenues of regional budgets emerges. Assessment of such revenues is neither made by the federal authorities nor by the regional are ones; and the respective losses of regional budgets not compensated by the federal budget. Through the example of the corporate property tax, it is illustrated that the main part of the shortfall in revenues relates to the preferences provided at the federal level. It is also revealed that the establishment of the institution of a consolidated group of taxpayers in the Russian Federation since 2012 had adverse impact on the powers of the regions of the Russian Federation in terms of their administration of the tax base of the territory. The distortion of the horizontal tax competition between regions for the taxpayer took place, as within a consolidated group of taxpayers, the net financial result of the group members suffers the tax, which contributes to erosion of the tax base (Base Erosion) with regard to the corporate profit tax. As a result, the amount of tax revenues to the regional budget does not depend on the actual contribution of each region to creation of favorable tax climate for investors.
