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  • 标题:Monetary Policy Committees and DeGrootian Consensus
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Christopher Spencer
  • 期刊名称:Economics Bulletin
  • 电子版ISSN:1545-2921
  • 出版年度:2014
  • 卷号:34
  • 期号:2
  • 出版社:Economics Bulletin
  • 摘要:Reaching a decision on the policy interest-rate often requires members of a monetary policy committee (MPC) to form a consensus. To model this phenomenon, a formal deliberation mechanism that captures how committee members achieve consensus à la Morris DeGroot (1974) is employed. Numerical simulations demonstrate how DeGroot's framework informs how so-called autocratically collegial, genuinely collegial, and individualistic MPCs (Blinder, 2007) reach agreement.
  • 关键词:Monetary policy committees ; consensus formation ; deliberation
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