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文章基本信息

  • 标题:The Agency Problem: Measures for Its Overcoming
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Meri Boshkoska
  • 期刊名称:International Journal of Business and Management
  • 印刷版ISSN:1833-3850
  • 电子版ISSN:1833-8119
  • 出版年度:2015
  • 卷号:10
  • 期号:1
  • 页码:204
  • DOI:10.5539/ijbm.v10n1p204
  • 出版社:Canadian Center of Science and Education
  • 摘要:

    As the corporative company type emerged, the two functions of ownership and management are separated. In the companies with a large number of employees the managers are the ones that manage the capital in the best interest of the shareholders.

    In this type of companies, conflict of interest may occur between the managers and the shareholders. Having more information about the work of the company, managers may use it in making decisions for their own benefit, which on the other hand cannot be as beneficial for the shareholders.

    Conflict of interest between managers and shareholders leads to so-called agency problem. There are different ways by which shareholders can control the operations of management. Some of the measures that can be used to resolve and prevent this problem are subject of analysis in this paper.

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