期刊名称：International Journal of Economics and Finance
印刷版ISSN：1916-971X
电子版ISSN：1916-9728
出版年度：2014
卷号：7
期号：1
页码：68
DOI：10.5539/ijef.v7n1p68
语种：English
出版社：Canadian Center of Science and Education
摘要：This study uses a random effect panel model to examine the impact of CEO traits and compensation on earnings performance and financial leverage for the 729 listed US companies in ExecuComp over the period of 2001–2010. The results indicate that CEO cash compensation has a negative relationship with earnings performance, but that it has a positive impact on financial leverage. Moreover, for CEOs, longer tenure results in reduced earnings risk-taking for debt financing, but older CEOs generate higher earnings and increase debt capacity. In addition, it is also found that there is a negative relationship between CEO compensation and earnings for firms with poor performance. Cash compensation increases the use of debt for high leverage companies, but equity-based compensation decreases the use of debt for low leverage companies. A longer tenure and greater age also have a negative relationship with both earnings and debt financing for poor performance or low leverage companies. However, older CEOs generate more earnings and financing capacity for firms with good performance or high leverage.
