摘要：Se presenta un modelo donde una norma social se internaliza por los agentes. Los infractores de la norma son estigmatizados, lo que se refleja en una reducción de utilidad. El costo del estigma, sin embargo, se reduce conforme crece el número de personas que no cumplen dicha norma. El modelo se aplica al análisis del trabajo infantil. En equilibrio, el costo del estigma esperado y observado es igual y el mercado laboral se vacía, tanto de mano de obra infantil como de adultos. La interacción estratégica da origen a multiplicidad de equilibrios
其他摘要：This paper constructs a model in which a social norm is internalized. The social disapproval of people who violate the norm -stigmatization-- is incorporated as a reduction in their utility. That reduction in utility is lower as the proportion of the population that violates the norm increases. In the model, society disapproves of people sending their children to work and parents care about that lq lq embarrassment". An equilibrium is constructed in which the expected and realized stigma costs are the same; and the wages rates of child and adult labor are such as to equate demand and supply for each kind of labor
关键词：Costo del estigma; Multiplicidad de equilibrios; Trabajo infantil; Mercado laboral
