出版社：Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração
其他摘要：Discretionary firm donation is usually related to the stakeholder theory and corporate social performance. Although theoretical explanations for this social behavior are pervasive in related literature, empirical modeling remains underdeveloped. We developed an explanatory structural model of discretionary firm donation using firm and industry level indicators. Unlike previous research, we estimated the explanatory power of the construct we called stakeholder orientation. Our tentative model was tested on a Brazilian sample of 101 publicly traded donor firms, using data on firm donations to social projects and to political candidates in electoral campaigns. The main results suggest that discretionary donation seems to be a strategy for managing conflicting claims in highly stakeholder oriented firms; the characteristics of the firm are more important than industry effects in explaining firm donations; and large firms, showing slack resources, and with a less concentrated ownership structure tend to engage in discretionary donation more intensively
