摘要：The TRIP agreement is, economically speaking, a dogs dinner. It ignores the diverging requirements countries have for the protection of intellectual property rights depending on their state of economic development. Furthermore, the agreement does not take into account the fact that incentives for research and development fluctuate between different firms and sectors. The agreement will, in the short run, lead to an increase in global inequality and may become a serious impediment to development in the worlds poorest countries. TRIPs-aftalen er en gang okonomisk makvaerk, som ignorerer landenes forskellig behov for beskyttelse af intellektuelle ejendomsrettigheder afhaengigt af okonomisk udvikling, og som tilsvarende overser at incitamentet for forskning og udvikling varierer imellem forskellige virksomheder og sektorer. Aftalen vil pa kort sigt fore til oget global ulighed og kan blive en alvorlig hindring for udviklingen i verdens fattigste lande.
