摘要：In this paper I focus on one very influential argument for open borders, the freedom of movement argument, which says that if we value freedom of movement we must demand open borders. I begin the paper the paper by discussing Joseph Carens’ well known version of the argument. I then consider, and reject, David Miller’s response to that argument. Finally, I develop my own reply to Carens. Both Carens and Miller, I argue, are mistaken about the proper grounds for freedom of movement. Once we see this, it is clear how we can value freedom of movement without being committed to open borders.Keywords: political theory; philosophy; ethics(Published: 1 March 2013)Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2013, pp. 25-37. http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/egp.v6i1.18188
