1.Optimal Insurance for a Minimal Expected Retention: The Case of an Ambiguity-Seeking Insurer

作　　者：Amarante, Massimiliano ;Ghossoub, Mario

出　　处：Risks. 2016 ;4(1).

出版社：MDPI, Open Access Journal

文章 ID：179934784

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2.Optimal Insurance for a Minimal Expected Retention: The Case of an Ambiguity-Seeking Insurer

作　　者：Amarante, Massimiliano ;Ghossoub, Mario

出　　处：Risks. 2016 ;4(1).

出版社：MDPI, Open Access Journal

文章 ID：179955123

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3.Optimal Insurance for a Minimal Expected Retention: The Case of an Ambiguity-Seeking Insurer

作　　者：Amarante, Massimiliano ;Ghossoub, Mario

出　　处：Risks. 2016 ;4(1).

出版社：MDPI, Open Access Journal

文章 ID：179974934

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4.States, Models and Information: A Reconsideration of Ellsberg's Paradox

作　　者：Amarante, Massimiliano

出　　处：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University. 2006 ;1.

出版社：New York University

文章 ID：47257599

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5.Analogical Reasoning in Decision Processes

作　　者：Amarante, Massimiliano

出　　处：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University. 2006 ;1.

出版社：New York University

文章 ID：47257601

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6.Ambiguous Events and Maxmin Expected Utility

作　　者：Amarante, Massimiliano ;Emel Filiz

出　　处：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University. 2005 ;1.

出版社：New York University

文章 ID：47257644

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7.States, Models and Unitary Equivalence I: Representation Theorems and Analogical Reasoning

作　　者：Amarante, Massimiliano

出　　处：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University. 2005 ;1.

出版社：New York University

文章 ID：47257646

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8.The Knob of the Discord

作　　者：Amarante, Massimiliano ;Fabio Maccheroni

出　　处：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University. 2005 ;1.

出版社：New York University

文章 ID：47257652

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9.Ambiguous Events

作　　者：Amarante, Massimiliano

出　　处：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University. 2004 ;1.

出版社：New York University

文章 ID：47257708

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10.Equivalence of Public Mixed-Strategies and Private Behavior-Strategies in Games with Public Monitoring

作　　者：Amarante, Massimiliano

出　　处：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University. 2003 ;1.

出版社：New York University

文章 ID：47257765

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