1.REMS-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs and the Antitrust Economics of Refusals to Deal with Potential General Competitors

作　　者：Butler, Henry N.

出　　处：Florida Law Review. 2016 ;67(3):977.

出版社：University of Florida Levin College of Law

文章 ID：168559700

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2.REMS-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs and the Antitrust Economics of Refusals to Deal with Potential General Competitors

作　　者：Butler, Henry N.

出　　处：Florida Law Review. 2016 ;67(3):977.

出版社：University of Florida Levin College of Law

文章 ID：168559702

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3.REMS-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs and the Antitrust Economics of Refusals to Deal with Potential General Competitors

作　　者：Butler, Henry N.

出　　处：Florida Law Review. 2016 ;67(3):977.

出版社：University of Florida Levin College of Law

文章 ID：168559704

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4.Symposium: Free at Last? The Contractual Theory of the Corporation and the New Maryland Officer-Director Liability Provisions

作　　者：Butler, Henry N. ;Ribstein, Larry E.

出　　处：University of Baltimore Law Review. 1989 ;18(2):6.

出版社：University of Baltimore Law

文章 ID：103475851

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5.Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority

作　　者：Butler, Henry N ;Macey, Jonathan R

出　　处：Yale Law & Policy Review. 1996 ;14(2):3.

出版社：Yale Law School

文章 ID：114190118

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6.The single-license solution: instead of federal chartering, states should compete with each other to produce efficient insurance regulation.

作　　者：Butler, Henry N. ;Ribstein, Larry E.

出　　处：Regulation. 2008 ;(December).

出版社：Cato Institute

文章 ID：184756868

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7.Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?

作　　者：Butler, Henry N. ;Wright, Joshua D.

出　　处：Florida Law Review. 2011 ;63(1):163.

出版社：University of Florida Levin College of Law

文章 ID：94783002

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8.Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System

作　　者：Butler, Henry N. ;Macey, Jonathan R.

出　　处：Cornell Law Review. 1988 ;73(4):677-718.

出版社：Cornell Law Library

文章 ID：94762954

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9.Health Care Reform: Perspectives from the Economic Theory of Regulation and the Econimc Theory of Statutory Interpretation

作　　者：Butler, Henry N. ;Macey, Jonathan R.

出　　处：Cornell Law Review. 1994 ;79(6):1434.

出版社：Cornell Law Library

文章 ID：94763210

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	Butler, Henry N.	8篇
	Macey, Jonathan R.	2篇
	Ribstein, Larry E.	2篇
	Butler, Henry N	1篇
	Macey, Jonathan R	1篇

	Florida Law Review	4篇
	Cornell Law Review	2篇
	Regulation	1篇
	University of Baltimore Law Review	1篇
	Yale Law & Policy Review	1篇